Irenus Watson Landingham was born in Alabama in 1839. His family moved to the vicinity of Houston, Texas, before the war. Landingham enlisted i the Bayou City Guards, which became Company A, 5th Texas Infantry. With his regiment he traveled to Virginia, where he eventually became part of Hood famed Texas Brigade. Prof. Susannah Ural, in her acclaimed Hood’s Texas Brigade (2017), quotes a letter that P Landingham wrote his mother on Nov. 1, 1861, from his unit camp outside Richmond. When they marched into Richmond a week before, “windows went down in a hurry;” Richmonders had heard that “Texan’s is com ing,” and they wanted to take look. At some point Landingham joined General Hood’s staff as clerk, and in this capacity he lowed Hood throughout the war. Happily, he kept in touch with his mother through letters that are preserved at the Auburn University Libraries Special Collections and Archiv (Landingham Papers, #552). When I recently visited Auburn to examine Landingham’s letter two specially caught my eye. Here they are.
Head Qrs. Hood’s Corps Near Atlanta, Ga. July 14, 1864
Dear Mother I rather expected a letter f some of you by the mornings ma but as none came, I must perfo content myself by writing. You certainly do not write often o would not have to complain so much.
Doubtless ere now, you are acquainted with the situation of military affairs in this department. The Chattahoochee river has seperated the two Armies for the last four or five days, and we have had an opportunity to rest a little. Sherman seems to have
hesitation in following, he had two corps on this side above us, but whether he intends to come on is a question left with the future to decide, the Yankee has such a high appreciation of his own abilities, that I will not be surprised to know of his crossing his whole Army soon. In that event we will probably fall back upon Atlanta, & perhaps even still farther, leaving that place the tender mercies of the minions. It is not yet quite time for us to strike—indeed I think the longe a battle here, can be postponed the better, as I believe we can whip Sherman, and if the Yankee nation can go to the polls next November with a crushing defeat in the west fresh upon their memories, it will make many a man stick in a “peace ticket.” We have, for the last two or three days, been sumptuously fed upon reports of Kirby Smith being on this side of the Mississippi, with a force, organizing, preparatory to striking Sherman in the rear. I earnestly hope there is some foundation for these reports, as it wi necessitate a retreat on Shermans part and then will come our time to work upon him. Genl Bragg is on a visit to the Army, but his occasion had not yet transpired. I notice Early, Breckinridge, &c, are kicking up a “big scare” in Maryland and Pennsylvania. I hope they may be able to take Baltimore and Washington. It would be a tremendous joke on King Abe, and would perhaps call forth a grin on the wrong side of the mouth, if Lee should take Washington before Grant gets to Richmond. I think in taking all things into consideration—affairs wear a pretty bright aspect. It is reported that the Legislature of Texas, has requested the President to grant the “Old Texas Brigade” a 90 days furlough at the close of the present campaign—Alas! there are but few to go. A storm has come up since I commenced writing, and the rain is beating through the tent so much, that I fear I shall have to
be briefer than I intended. Our presence on the south side of the Chattahoochee created considerable alarm in Atlanta, and the good people of that city have been getting to the rear in a hurry. I was in town a few days after we crossed, and there was so much confusion that it was a relief to get back to the Army again. Citizens hurrying to and fro with anxious faces, drays and wagons running about with furniture, Engines whistling, & puffing and blowing and shrieking, Hotel gongs ringing (and right then I went in and got din-
streets, Artillery rumbling, and every thing generally, in such a high state of haste and confusion that it did not present a very lo ly scene to a lover of tranquilit What has become of Cousin Anna? There really seems to be something strange about her writing to me, her silence has suggested many thoughts— thoughts which perhaps do injustice, and had therefore, better b kept to myself. Of course it is a pleasure to write, and receiving letters from those we love, but i Cousin Anna must write contrary to her own, or any body else’s feelings, it is best that she sho remain silent. You have not yet acknowledged the receipt of 10$ I sent some ti ago. Give my love to all, and kis Ella for me—there is only one to kiss now. Write soon. Your affectionate bo Watson Send me Mr. Davis’ proper address I wish to write to him
Landingham’s observatio of Atlantans “hurrying to and fro” in the days after Johnston’s army had retreated back across the Chattahoochee are echoed elsewhere. As I wrote in my What the Yankees Did to Us: Sherman’s Bombardment and Wrecking of Atlanta (2012), a correspondent for the Mobile News similarly observed, “everybody seems to be hurrying off, and especially the women….The excitement beats anything I ever saw.” The excitement was palpable when Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg stepped off the train in downtown Atlanta on the morning of July 13. Even before he rode to Johnston’s headquarters, Bragg shot a telegram to Richmond: “indications seem to favor an entire evacuation of this place.” Johnston, of course, did not evacuate Atlanta; he was fired by the War Department before he could do so. His successor, Gen. John B. Hood, defended the city for a month and a half, until Sherman cut his last railro
supply line. By this time command of Hood’s Corps had passed to Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, on whose staff Landingham remained. The Army of Tennessee evacuated Atlanta during the night of September 1-2. Landingham wrote home a few days later.
Dear Mother: Here we are twenty-five miles below Atlanta on the Macon R.R. and the Yankees have possession of the “Gate City.” On the night
from East Point and arrived at Jonesboro about 12 o’c the next day and immediately formed line of Battle. Hardees Corps was already there in line, and about 3 o’clock we attacked the enemy, but failed to dislodge him. The next morning we left Hardee in line and marched back to within five miles of Atlanta where we bivouaced. The City was evacuated that night at 12 o’c, and we started for this point the fol lowing morning, and arrived here yesterday. The loss of this Corps in the fight was 169 killed 1095 wounded, and 248 missing. Hardees loss was very small. The troops did not half fight or we might have saved Atlanta. Our failure to drive them back at Jonesboro made it necessary to abandon the city. Several trains of Ammunition were destroyed, but I believe most of everything else was gotten away. The enemy left the front of this Corps this morning and are reported to be falling back on Atlanta, tearing up the Rail Road as they go. It is impossible to form an idea of what will be done next, I do not think we can get Atlanta back without more troops, or somebody in Sherman’s communications who can accomplish something. Wheelers expedition seems to have been a fizzle, as Sherman does not mind him much. I wish Forrest could be sent to Tennessee he seems to be the only Cavalry Commander down this way who can accomplish anything. I expect the people are looking rather glum over the fall of Atlanta. I consider it a great di saster coming just at this juncture, but it may not be irreparable. If McClellan & Pendleton are elected in November, I think peace will soon follow. If not there is no telling how long the war will last. We have had no mail since we left Atlanta, the Army Post Offic was destroyed there, and another one has not been organized yet. I hope it will not be long, however before the mail for the army will
be ready for delivery. I wrote yo a few days before the evacuation of the city enclosing fifty Dolla (50$). I have not been able to learn whether mail left after that time or not, but hope it wen along all safe. There is no other news [worth] sharing. I haven’t time to write much more this even’g. Love to all, unto soon. Your Affectionate Son Watson
Landingham was incorrect in writing, “our failure to drive them back at Jonesboro made it necessary to abandon the city.” Around 3 p.m. on August 31— when Hardee and Lee were launching their attack on O.O. Howard’s three infantry corps at Jonesboro—Federals of Jacob Cox’s division struck the Macon & Western Railroad eight miles north of Jonesboro. It was this lodgment, and Hood’s learning of it within a few hours, that seale Atlanta’s doom. I had a map commissioned for my Atlanta Will Fall: Sherman, Joe Johnston and the Yankee Heavy Battalions (2001) to make this very point. This does not diminish the value—the charm, really—of Watson Landingham’s letters to his mother in Texas. Wayne Wolf and Bruce Allardice, who write articles about soldiers’ letters me that finding and publishing little-known epistles from the war front contribute to what we may call gaudium inventionis— the joy of discovery.
Note: As I wrote in this space last month, we’re all Civil War students and researchers, even if most of us are not “academics.” I therefore suspect some CWN readers have, like I did, found a interesting (AKA cool) letter or diary written by a Civil War participant. If you have a text or e cerpt to share, email it to us—we might be able to print it. Stephen Davis
Who sent the following message to the Confederate commander at Fort Donelson: “I propose to move immediately upon your works”? Who wrote Preside Lincoln, “I beg to present you as a Christmas gift, the City of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition”? This Union officer, a son of Irish immigrants, started ou serving in Missouri, then di tinguished himself as an infantry brigade commander at Perryville and Stones River. He ended the war as commander of all cavalry in the Army of the Potomac. Who? The preceding officer moved from west to east. Just the opposite occurred wi this Federal major general. His mediocre leadership of Hooker’s cavalry in spring 1863 led to his being relieved; he was later reassigned to Sherman’s army in Georgia. In his raid toward Macon in July 1864, he was pursued and overwhelmed by Confederate cavalry, and forced to surrender himself and much of his command. Who? In May 1862 this Northern general was sent to New Orleans after Federal capture of the city. Southerner excoriated him, calling him “Spoons” for alleged thiever of silverware and “Beast” fo his famous “Woman Order.” Who? The arrival of this U.S. major general’s army during the battle of Shiloh is wide seen as saving Grant from defeat in April 1862. But he allowed Bragg and Kirby Smith to maneuver him out
of middle Tennessee later in the summer. After the battle of Perryville, Ky., on Octob 8, 1862, Bragg retreated, bu this officer failed to pursu Within two weeks he was canned. Who? his Virginia-born career U.S. Army officer earned the famed nickname “Rock of Chickamauga.” Who? his intellectually brilliant Union general commanded Federal forces from St. Louis early in the war. Afte Shiloh he assumed command of Grant’s Army of the Tennessee, Buell’s Army of the Ohio and Pope’s Army of the Mississippi, some 110,000 men. But his advance to Corinth, Miss., was so cautious and lethargic th in July 1862 Lincoln kicked him upstairs to become general-in-chief in Washington. Who was this officer, nicknamed “Old Brains”? fter his lines were broken during the battle of Chickamauga, this commander of the Union Army of the Cumberland was later accused by James A. Garfield of having fled the field. Wh Recommended by Halleck and Grant, this Ohio-born officer was promoted to brig adier in August 1862 and to major general two months later. He led the XVII Corps at Vicksburg and the Army of the Tennessee in Sherman’s Georgia Campaign until his death near Atlanta. Who?
e Davis is the Civil War New Review Editor. an be contacted by email at:
Custer Loves War and the Ladies! Custer: The Making of a Young General. By Edward G. Longacre. Maps, bibliography, notes, index, 276 pp., 2018.
Unfortunately for his legacy, George Armstrong Custer is best known for his death in 1876 at the battle of Little Bighorn against the Lakota and Arapaho Tribes in Montana Territory. The general public knows much less about Custer’s exploits and accomplishments during the Civil War of 1861–1865. Edward G. Longacre, who has focused much of his research and writing career on Civil War cavalry commanders and operations, undertook to clarify and expand upon the historical record of George Custer’s service in the Union army—primarily as a cavalry officer. This is th first of a planned two-part seri Longacre laid the groundwork for his current study with prior pub cations, including The Cavalry a Gettysburg (1986), General John Buford: A Military Biography (1995), Lincoln’s Cavalrymen (2000) and Lee’s Cavalrymen (2002). In this current work, Longacr proposes “to identify and correc the myths, misconceptions, and misinterpretations about Custer the man.” He also intends to “ad depth to the Custer narrative” b including substantial detail abo his life and career. The author introduces the Ohi native George Armstrong Custer as an impulsive youth, born in 1839, whose hero was General Winfield Scott of Mexican War fame. Custer’s penchant for engaging in pranks and telling jok was in evidence during his years as a cadet at West Point. His be havior and lack of dedication to
the curriculum came within a whisker of ending his status as a cadet, and he graduated last in h class in 1861. Longacre points out that, depending on their geographic origin, hostility developed between West Point students prior to the Civil War. Yet Custer managed to maintain friendships with cadets from both the North and South.
Once he donned the uniform as a Union officer, he retained
amenity toward Southern friends and acquaintances—some of whom he met on the battlefield. Politically, he was more in tune with the South regarding lifestyl issues, including slavery, yet maintained an allegiance to the Union of states. The narrative describes battles in which Custer played a role either in a staff or line functio A paradox is evident concerning the mutual admiration between Custer, a daring young officer, and Maj. Gen. George McClellan, a slow-to-act army commander. Custer failed to find fault with McClellan even in ligh of the latter’s reluctance to act aggressively during the battle of Antietam and its aftermath. The author pays considerable attention to Custer’s relationship with young women, and his tenacious, and, at times, overbearing, pursuit of the hand of Libby Bacon—his future wife. While Custer’s social escapades are indicative of his personality Longacre also details Custer’s facility for maneuvering through the political morass to achieve promotion, as well as important assignments with the assistance of high-ranking military officers Indicative of his success in overcoming typical bureaucratic constraints, Custer received promotion from captain to brigadier general in the voluntee service just two years after graduating from West Point. His patron was Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, Army of the Potomac cavalry corps commander, who saw in this young officer, as wel as the fiery and reckless Hugh Judson Kilpatrick, the caliber of leader he wanted commanding his cavalry divisions and brigades. Longacre focuses in detail on Custer’s courageous performance against Stuart’s more numerous cavalry east of Gettysburg on July 3, 1863. Although not
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as famous as the charge named for Maj. Gen. George Pickett on that same date, Custer’s charge-while shouting to his Michigan horse soldiers, “Come on, you Wolverines!”—stymied Stuart’s attempt to break through Union defenses behind the main lines. I was an important contribution to
the Union victory at Gettysburg. To insure that Custer’s charac
ter and motivation in life are un derstood, Longacre quotes readily from Custer’s wartime letters. Prior to the retreat of Lee’s arm from Gettysburg, the author speculates whether Custer “must have wondered if the general commanding [Maj. Gen. George G. Meade] would be just as happy to see his antagonist escape.” Custer’s loss of patience with Meade’s cautious tendencies is seen in a letter he wrote not lon after the Gettysburg campaign, when both armies were back in the same location as when it began. In a compact, easy-to-read, well-documented narrativ Longacre fills in some blanks in George Custer’s story, and corrects a number of misconceptions. Maps and other illustrations help to keep track of event The author evaluates Custer’s performance as a West Point cadet, and as an officer in the Union army during the first two years of the war. His projected second volume “will cover the remainder of Custer’s Civil War service and his controversial sti in Texas during the early months of Reconstruction.” Given the sparsity of historical writings devoted to George Armstrong Custer’s service during the Civil War, Custer devotees as well as a more general audience will no doubt want to add Custer: The Making of a Young General to their collection
Thomas J. Ryan is the author of the award-winning Spies, Scouts, and Secrets in the Gettysburg Campaign: How the Critical Role of Intelligence Impacted the Outcome of Lee’s Invasion of the North, June-July 1863. His latest book, written with Richard R. Schaus, is titled Lee is Trapped, and Must be Taken: Eleven Fateful Days after Gettysburg, July 4-14, 1863 and is scheduled for publication by Savas Beatie later this Spring.
A Method Not For Everyone Decisions Manassas: at The Second Fourteen Critical Decisions that Defined
the Battle. By Matt Spruill III and Matt Spruill IV. Maps, photos, notes, index, 260 pp., 201 University of Tennessee Press,
In a lifetime, we have seen historiography of the Civil War morph continually as publishers try new ways to engage a readership flooded to their waists with words. Analytical works by academic scholars have always been the foundation of the hist ry business, but they often hav little appeal to the masses. Wi Freeman, Catton and Foote, narrative histories emerged as the dominant way the public engaged in its past. Then, in the 1980s beyond, a firehose of letters, ries and memoirs gave consumers new ways to engage the story of war. More recently, anthologies have become the thing, though the public seems little enthuse about them. The University of Tennessee Press has devised a new way for readers to engage the story
of key battles and events: a new series, “Command Decisions of the Civil War.” Matt Spruill
III and Matt Spruill IV—both retired military officers—have combined to produce the second volume of the series, Decisions a Second Manassas: The Fourteen Critical Decisions that Defined the Battle. The Spruills offer readers an adaptation of a military staff ri focused entirely on the decisions that they see as critical to the flow and outcome of the Second Manassas Campaign. The book makes no pretense to narrative. Instead, the authors parse fourteen moments, leading readers through what they perceive to have been the options available, the decision made, and the implication of that decision. The focu as the authors say, is less on wh happened than why it happened and why it mattered. We can surely argue number and nature of the critical decisi that shaped the campaign (and if we had more wordage available to us at the moment, we would). But most of the critical decision the authors identify are obvious and their analysis is useful and interesting: Halleck’s decision to have McClellan evacuate the Peninsula; Lee’s decision to send Jackson on his flank march and Jackson’s subsequent decision to initiate the battle with Pope on August 28; Pope’s decision to attack on August 30…and many more. The various options the authors present generally seem to be those most likely considered by the players on the ground at the time. Like a list of the 10 greatest lefties of all time, this book is tended to provoke, and that’s pre cisely what many readers will lik best about it. There is enough to argue about. The authors explore the decision to create the Union’
Army of Virginia but spend little ink on Lincoln’s critical decisio to place John Pope in command
of that army. (Indeed, the book little addresses the political co text of the campaign—this is military history in pure form.) They barely reference perhaps the most important decision of the campaign: Pope’s choice to engage Lee at all, instead of falli back behind Bull Run to merge his own army with McClellan’s Army of the Potomac without a climactic battle. In a few instances, the discus sion of the “critical” decisions presented seems to rely on presumptions that may seem reasonable, but are not necessarily supported by what’s known. The authors present the dilemma of Fitz John Porter on the morning of August 29 as if he had affirma tive, or at least knowable, order to attack Jackson, when in fact he did not. The authors’ analysis of the decision of Col. Nathan McLean to keep his brigade on Chinn Ridge and fight on the afternoon of August 30 rides on a thin foundation of source material indeed. We know almost nothing about McLean’s orders or thinking, or the limits placed upon him by superiors. Of course, these are precisely the sorts of arguments a book like this is intended to provoke. The Spruills’ writing is straight forward and clear. The maps are good and numerous (31 in all). In fact, in some cases, these are th best published maps available on certain phases of the battle The authors’ method won’t appeal to everyone, but for those a who looking for an examination of a military campaign through the lens of decision-making, as i on a military staff ride, this bo will intrigue and satisfy.
John Hennessy is the author of Return to Bull Run: The Campaign
and Battle of Second Manassas (1993), and The First Battle of Manassas: An End To Innocence July 18-21, 1861 (1989). Formerly historian at Manassas National Battlefield, he is presently the
Chief Historian at Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Militar Park.
Battle of Chattanooga Decisions at Chattanooga: The Nineteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Battle. By Larry Peterson. Maps, appendices, notes, photos, index, 176pp 2018. University of Tennessee
Larry Peterson defines a crit cal decision as one of such magnitude that it shapes the succes or failure of a battle or campai He succinctly presents three pre-battle decisions, nine decisions during the battle, and sev decisions post-battle that might have altered the outcome of the Chattanooga campaign. From the Union perspective, Abraham Lincoln’s reinforcement of the Army of the Cumberland, Grant’s restructuring of the Union’s three western departments, the opening of the “Cracker Line,” and General George Thomas’ troops taking Missionary Ridge were the crucial decisions that ultimately led to Northern victory. For the South, Braxton Bragg’s disper-
sal of troops after Chickamauga to rid his army of malcontents, his poorly designed defensive lines, including the use of a to graphical crest line of defense, and Patrick Cleburne’s protec-
tion of the Confederate retreat stand out as the turning points for the South. While the first t Southern decisions led to the fa of Chattanooga, the third saved Bragg’s army from annihilation. The result was the South’s loss of Chattanooga, a critical rail supply depot and opening point on the road to Atlanta for Willi
T. Sherman. The author argues that these personnel, tactical an organizational decisions defined the result and perhaps sealed the Confederacy’s fate. The author includes an extensive driving tour to the location of all nineteen critical decision This is perhaps the most valuable inclusion in the book. To enhance this section, he includes narratives from battle participants to add an historical “I was there” perspective which creates the imagery for the tourist. An appendix also details both the Union and Confederate order of battle to clarify division and brigade placement and participation. While the nineteen critical decisions are clearly defined with options offered for each, any such analysis will be open to other possibilities that are equa ly valid. Likewise, there are a number of whys not examined. For example, why did Grant continue to promote Sherman, when his performance at Chattanooga was abysmal? How did James Longstreet’s personal ambitions overshadow his effective cooperation with Bragg? What led Grant to assign George Thomas a supporting role at Chattanooga? And finally, when options were chosen, how did they affect future decisions? The nineteen selected options did not exist in a vacuum but ultimately interacted in a we of actions that changed as the ba tle progressed. This cause-andeffect is inadequately addressed. This book certainly contains a number of interesting options that helped to shape the battle. Yet more comprehensive battle analyses by Wiley Sword, Peter Cozzens, Matt Spruill and David Powell, among others, address all of these issues in greater depth and comprehensiveness. Perhaps
this book’s greatest benefit is t travel guide for the visiting his
Emeritus at South Suburban College, Illinois, and the author of numerous Civil War books and articles, including Two Years Before the Paddlewheel: Charles F. Gunther, Mississippi River Confederate (2012), co-edited wit Bruce S. Allardice. He is current researching soldiers’ letters tha add a personal touch to the war.
