Quick: what do Winston Churchill and Newt Gingrich have in common?
Answer: Not much, but they both wrote an “alternative history” about how Robert E. Lee won the battle of Gettysburg.
Between these bookends, there is actually a sizable body of writing about a Confederate victory in Pennsylvania, July 1863. I’ve chosen to look at some of it in this month’s column.
Churchill was not yet prime minister of England when, in 1930, he wrote a short story, “If Lee Had Not Won the Battle of Gettysburg.” Most of Churchill’s musings involve what happened after Lee captured Washington and the Treaty of Harpers Ferry is signed in Sept. 1863, allowing the South to win the war. But he hints at how the Confederates won Gettysburg. Pickett’s charge cracks the Union line just as Jeb Stuart’s cavalry, sweeping around the Yankees’ flank into their rear, creates a “panic which engulfed the whole left of Meade’s massive army.”1
If Winston Churchill’s scenario is little known today, try the one given in the speech delivered by an attorney from Savannah, Ga., Alexander A. Lawrence, to the Atlanta Historical Society in Oct. 1947. Entitled “If Longstreet Had Come Up at Gettysburg.” In this version Lee’s war horse kicks off the battle at 9 a.m. on July 2, catching Union troops unprepared. Within an hour Confederates have taken the Peach Orchard and soon both Round Tops. Ewell in turn attacks and takes Culp’s Hill. Having lost their key positions, Meade’s army begins to retire. Foolhardy Union counterattacks against Lee’s strong line on Cemetery Ridge merely bring more Northern casualties.
Meade retreats southward as, the next day, July 3, Lee army pursues hard. Stuart’s cavalry rounds up thousands of prisoners; Confederate infantry and artillery pummel one Union corps after another until by 4 p.m. the Army of the Potomac is not merely routed; it is effectively destroyed. Ewell’s corps is sent off toward Harrisburg to raid and destroy Union communications while Gen. Lee, with the rest of the army, marches down and lays siege to Washington. With the Confederate navy helping to cut off Northern supplies—England
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recognizes the Confederacy, so the blockade soon falls apart— Lee’s troops reduce Washingtonians to starvation rations of horsemeat. Finally, after Lincoln is captured trying to slip out in disguise, the capital formally surrenders on Oct. 25, 1863. The ceremony takes place onboard the CSS Alabama, anchored in the Potomac waters.
The arrogant Yankees in New York and New England refuse to give up, however. So to teach “those people” a lesson, Gen. Lee’s army (now fully 100,000 strong, filled with Rebel recruits eager to cinch the victory), crosses the Delaware in early 1864. By April 1, 1864, the Confederate flag flies over Times Square in New York City. “The surrender of Brooklyn,” Lawrence explains, “was delayed for several days by the difficulty the Confederates experience in finding any officials in that city who could conduct the negotiations in English.”2
Now for something completely different: the speculation written by Otto Eisenschiml and E.B. Long in 1948. In it Jeb Stuart joins Lee at Cashtown around June 30, bringing word of Meade’s dispositions. Lee decides to take a strong defensive position at Cashtown, daring Meade to attack him there. Ordered by Halleck to do so, Meade’s army wrecks itself in bloody repulses which come to be termed “the Cashtown Slaughter.” “Two thirds of the Union Army were left dead or wounded on the field,” the authors explain, as the survivors retreat south. Lee’s triumph is so impressive that England and France recognize the Confederacy.3
A few years later, science fictionist Ward Moore wrote a novel about historical time-travel in which the protagonist returns to Gettysburg to witness the Confederates’ astonishing victory. Southern infantry take the Round Tops on July 1 during their rout of the I and XI Corps. They bring up artillery which dominates the field on the second day as Lee’s troops get astride the Taneytown road “and into position from which they tore Meade’s army to bits from three sides.” Then, on July 3, with Pickett’s charge, “the disorganized Federals were given the final killing blow in their vitals.” The routed Yankees stream northward in “the Great Retreat to Philadelphia,” harassed by Stuart’s cavalry. Lee captures Washington, besieges Philadelphia, and runs down other pockets of resistance in Pennsylvania. The Yankees’ surrender at Reading ends the war in the east, while a “disastrous Union counter-thrust in Tennessee” brings defeat for them at Chattanooga. The peace of Richmond follows, recognizing Confederate independence on July 4, 1864.4
The granddaddy of counterfactual history, of course, is If the South Had Won the Civil War, by MacKinlay Kantor. The novella appeared in the Nov. 22, 1960 issue of LOOK Magazine. Then, slightly amended, it was printed as a paperback in April 1961— centennial anniversary of the start of the war.
Kantor has the South winning the war on both fronts. In Mississippi, leading his army toward Vicksburg in mid-May 1863, Ulysses Grant falls from his rearing horse, suffers concussion and dies. Sherman takes over, approaches Vicksburg, and then dashes his forces futilely against John C. Pemberton’s fortifications. Joe Johnston brings up his army and hammers the Yankees from the rear. Sherman himself is drilled in the head by a Southern bullet. “The Army of the Tennessee,” writes Kantor, “weakened and demoralized, was trapped against the Mississippi shore” by the combined armies of Pemberton and Johnston. It surrenders on June 30.
A thousand miles away, at Gettysburg, the Southerners win again. After his infantry chases the I and XI Corps through town, Lee shows uncharacteristic resolve in ordering Dick Ewell to attack Cemetery and Culp’s Hills. The Confederates storm the heights and send the Yankees packing. “The battered Eleventh Corps - or rather the survivors of that much-mauled organization,” Kantor explains, “gave way rapidly and blundered toward the rear in panic.” When Lee orders his troops to seize the Round Tops south of town before the enemy can, he is in position to dispatch Meade’s several corps as they come up. The Confederate army launches hot pursuit, “crushing the Northern forces in detail,” with vigorous help from Stuart’s cavalry. “By sunset on July 3,” the author concludes, “the Army of the Potomac had dissolved into hopeless tatters – a pitiful mockery of an army.” After Washington falls and Lincoln surrenders, U.S. officials agree to a peace conference in September, which recognizes Confederate independence.5
Pete Longstreet gets his due in Mark Nesbitt’s If the South Won Gettysburg (1980). After his infantry has routed the two Union infantry corps on July 1, Gen. Lee takes Longstreet’s advice and breaks off the battle. The Confederate army maneuvers southward, interposing between Meade and Washington. Lee forms a strong line along Rock Creek and dares the Federals to attack him there. When they do, July 3-5, Meade’s forces are bloodily beaten back, losing 12,000 men; Sedgwick is killed, Win Hancock wounded seriously. The surviving corps leaders counsel surrender. “There was no more to be done. Ammunition was dangerously low,” Nesbitt relates; “if the Confederates decided to attack they would have no problem over-running the demoralized men under Meade’s command.” Reluctantly the Union commander decides to give in, and under a flag of truce asks to meet with Lee, although, Meade tells his staff, he would rather die a thousand deaths.6
Sheldon Vanauken offers a different take in his article, “The World After the South Won.” The story hinges on the British, whose government, in conjunction with the French, offers in early November 1862 to mediate the American conflict. The C.S. government agrees; the U.S. government belligerently refuses. England accordingly recognizes the Confederacy. As Vanauken’s tongue-incheek narrative approaches its conclusion, regiments of the British Expeditionary Force, including the Coldstream Guards, are wheeling into line to help General Lee’s army crush the Federals at Gettysburg. “The Allies” march into Washington within a few days, and shortly thereafter the United States government (temporarily removed to Portland, Me.) signs a treaty of peace with the Confederacy.7
We could go on, but I’m running out of space. Edward G. Longacre imagines what might have happened if Jeb Stuart, rather than riding off on a raid, had kept close to Lee’s army in late June. Confederate cavalry feeds intelligence to Lee as Meade’s army approaches, and drives Yankee troopers through Gettysburg on July 1. Ewell’s divisions seize the town and the heights south of it, destroying the I and XI Corps. Meade deploys the rest of his army along Pipe Creek, but Lee is in no hurry to bring on battle. For weeks, gray columns forage in central Pennsylvania as an exasperated Lincoln fires Meade and replaces him with Dan Sickles. After Stuart’s horsemen sack Philadelphia, Lee finally launches his crushing blow against Sickles’ army. “The magnitude of the Union defeat – the last full-scale battle in the eastern theater,” Longacre concludes, “deserves a broader canvas than this essay can provide.”8
The richness of our topic is affirmed by publication of an entire book of essays, Alternative Gettysburgs (2002). One of my favorites is that by William R. Forstchen, “Lee’s Victory at Gettysburg…And Then What?” The author envisions “not a half victory such as Second Manassas where the Union army is sent reeling in retreat but nevertheless escapes relatively intact.” Rather, Forstchen sees Southerners achieving “an Austerlitz or Cannae, a battle of near-total annihilation.” The prospect of Robert E. Lee emulating Hannibal (Cannae, 216 B.C.) or Napoleon (Austerlitz, 1805) is thrilling indeed. On July 2, Hood and Ewell swing around their respective flanks to envelop Meade’s army, which is caught in “a classic double envelopment which triggers a panic in the Union army.” The Confederates pour in a merciless fire (Hancock, Chamberlain dead), and take 40,000 prisoners. Meade gives up his sword, and Stuart chases down the Yankees managing to escape.9
It is this same Bill Forstchen who is Newt Gingrich’s co-author in their Gettysburg (2003). As we’ve seen before, Lee takes Longstreet’s advice, marches to a defensive position south of Gettysburg and forces Meade to attack. Lee’s veterans inflict so many casualties that the Army of the Potomac is virtually destroyed. “My fault, all my fault,” a grieving Meade laments just before he is shot and killed while trying to escape.
At the end of Forstchen and Gingrich’s story, President Lincoln is vowing to continue the war, wondering how he will do it. “There are so many ifs now,” he says.10
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Lincoln was right. There are still so many ifs, and Gettysburg offers a whole lot of them.
Endnotes: 1. Winston Churchill, “If Lee
3. Otto Eisenschiml and E.B.
4. Ward Moore, Bring the Jubi
5. MacKinlay Kantor, “If the
6. Mark Nesbitt, If the South
8. Edward G., Longacre, “’Ab
9. William R. Forstchen, “Lee’s
10. Newt Gingrich and William had Not Won the Battle of Gettysburg,” in J.C. Squires, ed., If: Or History Rewritten (New York, 1931; originally published in Scribner’s Magazine, December 1930).
A. Lawrence, Tongue in Cheek (Atlanta, 1979), 38.
Long, As Luck Would Have It: Chance and Coincidences in the Civil War (Indianapolis, 1948), 86.
lee (New York, 1952), 1, 133, 187.
South Had Won the Civil War,” LOOK, Nov. 22, 1960, 32.
Won Gettysburg (Gettysburg, 1980), 146.
Vanauken, “The World After the South Won,” Southern Partisan, Spring 1984, 15.
solutely Essential to Victory’: Stuart’s Cavalry in the Gettysburg-Pipe Creek Campaigns,” in Peter G. Tsouras, ed., Dixie Victorious: An Alternate History of the Civil War (London, 2004), 169.
Victory at Gettysburg…And Then What?” in Brian Thomsen and Martin H. Greenberg, eds., Alternate Gettysburgs (New York, 2002), 325-26. R. Forstchen, Gettysburg: A Novel of the Civil War (New York, 2003), 450, 461.
Small Talk
We’re always glad that our “trivia” column elicits thoughtful corrections. One such is mailed to us by Ora Eads of Nashville, who refers to our first quiz of this past April. In question 3 we stated “other than the Lincoln conspirators, only one man was executed by the U.S. after the war for his wartime activities.” Our answer was Henry Wirz, Andersonville commandant, who was hanged in Washington on Nov. 10, 1865.
But Ora reminds us that Confederate guerrillas in Missouri were charged during the war and subsequently hanged. One such was the notorious Champ Ferguson, whose neck was stretched Oct. 20, 1865. Another was Lt. Charles Brownlee, charged in 1863 as a bushwhacker and spy. When he surrendered after the war, “expecting to be granted the same generous terms as other ex-Confederates,” as Mr. Eads writes us, he was apprehended and hanged on May 10, 1865.
And more on our blunder, in our May column, when we implied that the war ended with Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. Diane M. Smith, Site Manager of Bennett Place State Historic Site in Durham, reminds us that Joe Johnston surrendered there on April 26, not to mention Dick Taylor’s capitulation in Alabama May 4; Kirby Smith May 26, etc.
“We continually have to educate our visitors on the intricacies of the end of the War,” Diane adds, “and inform them that Appomattox was simply the
Powell Wins 22nd Austin Civil War Round Table’s Prize
AUSTIN, TEXAS—David A. Powell, a Chicago historian has won the twenty second annual Daniel M. and Marilyn W. Laney Book Prize given by the Austin Civil War Round Table, Inc. The winning work is The Chickamauga Campaign―Barren Victory: The Retreat into Chattanooga, the Confederate Pursuit, and the Aftermath of the Battle, September 21 to October 20, 1863, published by Savas Beatie.
Barren Victory is the third and concluding volume of Powell’s Chickamauga Campaign trilogy, a comprehensive examination of one of the most important and complex military operations of the Civil War. Barren Victory examines the immediate aftermath of the battle with unprecedented detail.
dawn on Monday, Sept. 21, beginning of the end and NOT the final end.”
Well done, readers! Keep me honest with those emails and letters! Answers are on page 29.
And now, for some Gettysburgrelated questions: 1.
1863, with Union commander Gen. William S. Rosecrans in Chattanooga and most of his Federal army in Rossville, Ga. Confederate commander Gen. Braxton Bragg has won the signal victory of his career, but has yet to fully grasp that fact or the fruits of his success. With the publication of Barren Victory, the Chickamauga Campaign and the bloodiest two days of the Civil War has the detailed history it never has had before. Sickles at Gettysburg, in a review of Powell’s book wrote, “The post-battle coverage is simply unprecedented among prior ranging from graphic eyewitness descriptions of the battlefield’s horrors to in-depth consideration of the outcome’s strategic and political implications. Powell seamlessly weaves the stories The bronze monument honoring North Carolina soldiers at Gettysburg, dedicated in 1929, was sculpted by an artist known for another famous chiseled American memorial. Who was he?
A Confederate division commander ordered Brig. Gen. James Johnston Pettigrew on June 30 to march to Gettysburg and “search the town for army supplies (especially shoes).” Name him.
From Abraham Lincoln to Jimmy Carter, presidents of the United States have visited Gettysburg battlefield. One bought a farm there, at which he lived after his time in the White House. Which president?
Thirty years after the battle, this Union officer was awarded the Medal of Honor for “daring heroism and great tenacity in holding his position on the Little Round Top against repeated assaults.” Who?
A lot of historians have tackled Gettysburg on one of its three days, but this author published notable books on The First Day (2001), The Second Day (1987), and even Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill (1993). Which writer are we talking about?
Walking through Soldiers National Cemetery, one sees
10. Before President Lincoln was
of the campaign’s large cast of characters together, including full discussions of Braxton Bragg’s limited options... Every enthusiast of the American Civil War’s Western Theater will want this essential final volume of Dave Powell’s series in their personal library.”
The Laney Prize money of $2,000 will be awarded to Powell at the June 22, 2017, meeting of the Austin Civil War Round Table, Inc.
The Daniel M. & Marilyn W. Laney Prize is awarded yearly by the Austin Civil War Round Table, Inc. for distinguished scholarship and writing on the military or political history of the Civil War.
tablets bearing lines from a poem written to honor American soldiers of the Mexican War. What are the names of the poem and of its author?
In Michael Shaara’s The Killer Angels, Longstreet relates to Fremantle that he had been chatting around a fire when someone remarked, “Well, maybe you are come from an ape, and maybe I am come from an ape, but General Lee, he didn’t come from no ape.” The Southerners were discussing a book, On the Origin of Species, which had been published just two years before the war. Who wrote it?
On the second day, the Irish brigade prepared to go into the fight when a priest stepped up on a boulder and offered a prayer of absolution. The soldiers knelt, hats off and heads bowed, as the chaplain reminded them that the “Catholic church refuses Christian burial to the soldier who turns his back upon the foe or deserts his flag.” What was the name of the priest?
“The 18 guns have been driven off. For God’s sake come quick, or we cannot support you. Ammunition nearly out.” This note was sent to General Pickett just before the Confederates launched their charge on the third day. Who wrote it?
Book Explores Union High Command Dysfunction During the McClellan Years
McClellan and the Union High Command, 1861-1863: Leadership Gaps That Cost a Timely Victory. By Jeffrey W. Green. Bibiography, endnotes, 214 pp., 2017. McFarland & Co., Inc., www.mcfarlandpub.com. $35.00.
The first two years of the Civil War were marked by the Union’s inability to devise and implement a successful military strategy. At the heart of this problem were the failures of the North’s primary army, the Army of the Potomac in the Virginia Theater. In his new book, Australian history lecturer Jeffrey Green explores this problem as one of dysfunction at the highest levels. Green evaluates the tenure of the army’s first commander, George B. McClellan, and the legacy which resulted from repeated violations of the chain of command by politicians and generals.
Green describes conflicting traditions which clashed when the nation confronted its most complex and biggest war up to that date: (1) a largely distrusted professional military establishment leading a small standing army, and (2) reliance on volunteer militia in times of crisis, led by non-professional civilians. The consequence, in Green’s view, was that from August 1861 forward, proper military protocol was disregarded as the president, cabinet officers, members of Congress, McClellan himself, and subordinate generals routinely ignored the chain of command. This problem persisted throughout McClellan’s tenure until November 1862 and continued when his successors, Ambrose Burnside and Joseph Hooker, were Publishers:
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CWN Book Review Editor, Stephen Davis 4090 Audubon Drive, Marietta, GA 30068-2605 undermined by pro-McClellan subordinates who freely met with Lincoln and with other civilians to lodge complaints about their commanding officers.
Green’s conclusion is that this dysfunction prevented the Union from formulating and implementing an effective military strategy. Instead, it persisted in what Green views as the failed “limited war”/ Virginia-centric strategy that was pursued throughout the first two years.
Green has capably shown the dysfunction, which he identifies and whose causes he describes. Less compelling are his conclusions about consequences on the battlefield. There is little doubt that it may have played a role in the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, especially in the tug of war between McClellan and Lincoln over the number of troops withheld from the former to protect Washington. But other failures by the Army of the Potomac are more convincingly tied to poor tactical and operational decisions. Chancellorsville, in particular, probably should have resulted in a significant Union victory, and even Fredericksburg as planned by Burnside need not have ended in the bloody failure which ensued when what was originally intended as a supporting attack became the principal effort. Green also ignores the significant role of the Confederate opponent in these battles.
Green’s criticism of the weight placed by the Union command on Virginia and of the original “limited war” aims (on which most agreed at the time) is questionable. While Green has employed a number of the important primary and secondary sources, he unaccountably has not accessed the late Joseph L. Harsh’s still-authoritative 1970 Ph.D. thesis, “George Brinton McClellan and the Forgotten Alternative.” Harsh insightfully described McClellan’s August 1861 plan as one which sought to impose overwhelming force on the Confederacy’s main army in Virginia, not simply on its capital at Richmond, and which envisioned several coordinated supporting offensives in Tennessee, the Mississippi, and elsewhere. The significant difference between this plan and that which Grant undertook with ultimate success in 1864 apparently was not the objective—it was McClellan’s intent to fight one decisive battle rather than Grant’s campaign of attrition.
Green’s rejection of the “Virginia first” strategy also ignores the realities of a Federal capital which was plainly vulnerable to attack from the immediately neighboring Confederacy and of the Confederates’ own concentration of force in Virginia. Moreover, while Green has squarely blamed McClellan and Lincoln for the 1861 undermining of General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, Harsh showed that this was an important part inevitably due to Scott’s virtual abdication of his duties after First Bull Run and to the administration’s and Scott’s failure to adequately limit McClellan’s role.
There are editorial concerns. Throughout, there is occasional repetition of facts already stated and a random failure to identify actors who emerge onto the scene. These problems reach a crescendo in the chapter on Hooker. He did not graduate from West Point in 1827, nor did he graduate in the same class with William T. Sherman. Hooker did not have 170,000 troops in the Army of the Potomac in spring 1863, and the deceased Edwin V. Sumner could not have been one of Hooker’s complaining subordinates after Chancellorsville. Errors of this type should have been caught.
While these flaws detract from Green’s work, his book does make a convincing case that all of the actors involved created a climate of tension, conflict, and “back door” communication which could not have helped the Union effort. Perhaps this was due in part to leaders learning new, previously undefined roles and to an administration which had to satisfy a number of opposed constituencies among the Border States, loyal Democrats, and the radicals in Lincoln’s own party.
For these reasons, Green’s book is worthwhile for demonstrating how command dysfunction quickly and persistently became a central feature of the Union’s war.
John Foskett is a practicing attorney in Boston with a lifelong interest in the Civil War. He is descended from Isaac Foskett, who served for three years in the Engineer Battalion with the Army of the Potomac. In addition to numerous reviews in Civil War News, he has given Civil War Roundtable presentations on the subject of Civil War field artillery tactics.
Top Ten at Gettysburg. By Richard Bellamy, Jay Jorgensen, Lawrence Korczyk, Michael Rupert, William “Pat” Schuber, Ralph Siegel and James Woods. Edited by Jay Jorgensen. Map, photos, notes, index, 280 pp, 2017. History Attic Books, 1162 St. George Avenue #139, Avenel NJ 07001. $25.
Reviewed by Robert Grandchamp
More has been written about the battle of Gettysburg than any other event in the Civil War. What makes this book unique is that it is a collaboration by several well-known authors who have combined their talents to compile a list of the “top ten” regarding different aspects of Gettysburg. In his introduction, Editor Jay Jorgensen relates that the idea for the book came after watching an episode of David Letterman’s Late Show and his famous “Top 10” skits, as well as his wife’s participation in the Gettysburg marathon. Jorgensen, a judge from New Jersey, is the author of an acclaimed book on the Wheatfield at Gettysburg, and his contributors are equally well known in the field.
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detailed tactical histories of what individual soldiers and regiments were doing on the field, this book does not fit that bill. Rather, it is a great overview of what the authors feel are defining aspects of the battle. In that Top Ten at Gettysburg is a macro-history, rather than a micro-history.
The book’s colorful potpourri includes such categories as the Top 10 Rare and Unique Cannon on Exhibit in the Park, Top 10 Command Decisions, Top 10 Enduring Controversies, and Top 10 Colonels at Gettysburg. Each contributor presents his own piece, and there is no argument or discussion among them about what others might feel could have made the list
Each Top 10 is subjective and other readers might have other opinions, but together they provide a great blend of famous and not so famous quotes, monuments, and participants from the battle. The authors do a great job in providing equal treatment to both Union and Confederate participants. The book is well illustrated and contains some good maps to illustrate where the events chronicled took place.
In conclusion, this book presents a great blend of material from the battle of Gettysburg. It is well written, and expertly edited by Jorgensen. Both the novice and the well-read scholar of the battle will find enlightening information. A detailed bibliography, maps, and illustrations add to the work.
Robert Grandchamp is the awardwinning author of eleven books on American military history. He received his M.A. in American history from Rhode Island College. A former National Park Ranger, Robert is an analyst with the government, and resides with his wife in Jericho Center, Vermont.
