tive Gettysburgs (2002). One of         Endnotes:                                                                                                            and of its author?
tive Gettysburgs (2002). One of Endnotes: and of its author?

Quick: what do Winston Churchill and Newt Gingrich have in common? Answer: Not much, but they both wrote an “alternative hist ry” about how Robert E. Lee won the battle of Gettysburg. Between these bookends, ther is actually a sizable body of w ing about a Confederate victory in Pennsylvania, July 1863. I’v chosen to look at some of it in this month’s column. Churchill was not yet prime minister of England when, in 1930, he wrote a short story, “ Lee Had Not Won the Battle of Gettysburg.” Most of Churchill’ musings involve what happened after Lee captured Washington and the Treaty of Harpers Ferry is signed in Sept. 1863, allowi the South to win the war. But h hints at how the Confederates

itic ’ s C orner won Gettysburg. Pickett’s charge cracks the Union line just as Jeb Stuart’s cavalry, sweeping around the Yankees’ flank into their rea creates a “panic which engulfed the whole left of Meade’s massive army.”1 If Winston Churchill’s scenari is little known today, try the on given in the speech delivered by an attorney from Savannah, Ga., Alexander A. Lawrence, to the Atlanta Historical Society in Oct. 1947. Entitled “If Longstree Had Come Up at Gettysburg.” In this version Lee’s war horse kicks off the battle at 9 a.m. on July 2, catching Union troops unprepared. Within an hour Confederates have taken the Peach Orchard and soon both Round Tops. Ewell in turn attacks and takes Culp’s Hill. Having los their key positions, Meade’s army begins to retire. Foolhardy Union counterattacks against Lee’s strong line on Cemetery Ridge merely bring more Northern casualties. Meade retreats southward as, the next day, July 3, Lee army pursues hard. Stuart’s cavalry rounds up thousands of prisoners; Confederate infantry and artillery pummel one Union corps after another until by 4 p.m. the Army of the Potomac is not merely routed; it is effectively destroyed. Ewell’s corps is sent off toward Harrisburg to raid and destroy Union communications while Gen. Lee, with the rest of the army, marches down and lays siege to Washington. With the Confederate navy helping to cut off Northern supplies—England

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recognizes the Confederacy, so the blockade soon falls apart— Lee’s troops reduce Washingtonians to starvation rations of horsemeat. Finally, after Lincoln is captured trying to slip out in disguise, the capital formally surrenders on Oct. 25, 1863. The ceremony takes place onboard the CSS Alabama, anchored in the Potomac waters. The arrogant Yankees in New York and New England refuse to give up, however. So to teach “those people” a lesson, Gen. Lee’s army (now fully 100,000 strong, filled with Rebel recruit eager to cinch the victory), cros es the Delaware in early 1864. By April 1, 1864, the Confederate flag flies over Times Square New York City. “The surrender of Brooklyn,” Lawrence explains, “was delayed for several days by the difficulty the Confederates experience in finding any officia in that city who could conduct th negotiations in English.”2 Now for something completely different: the speculation writte by Otto Eisenschiml and E.B. Long in 1948. In it Jeb Stuart joins Lee at Cashtown around June 30, bringing word of Meade’s dispositions. Lee decides to take a strong defensive position at Cashtown, daring Meade to attack him there. Ordered by Halleck to do so, Meade’s army wrecks itself in bloody repulses which come to be termed “the Cashtown Slaughter.” “Two thirds of the Union Army were left dead or wounded on the field,” the authors explain, as t survivors retreat south. Lee’s tr umph is so impressive that England and France recognize the Confederacy.3 A few years later, science fic tionist Ward Moore wrote a novel

about historical time-travel in which the protagonist returns to Gettysburg to witness the Confederates’ astonishing victory. Southern infantry take the Round Tops on July 1 during their rout of the I and XI Corps. They bring up artillery which dominates the field on the second day as Lee’s troops get astride the Taneytown road “and into position from which they tore Meade’s army to bits from three sides.” Then, on July 3, with Pickett’s charge, “t disorganized Federals were given the final killing blow in their v tals.” The routed Yankees stream northward in “the Great Retreat to Philadelphia,” harassed by Stu art’s cavalry. Lee captures Washington, besieges Philadelphia, and runs down other pockets of resistance in Pennsylvania. The Yankees’ surrender at Reading ends the war in the east, while a “disastrous Union counter-thrust

in Tennessee” brings defeat for them at Chattanooga. The peace of Richmond follows, recognizing Confederate independence on July 4, 1864.4 The granddaddy of counterfactual history, of course, is If th South Had Won the Civil War, by MacKinlay Kantor. The novella appeared in the Nov. 22, 1960 issue of LOOK Magazine. Then, slightly amended, it was printed as a paperback in April 1961— centennial anniversary of the start of the war. Kantor has the South winning the war on both fronts. In Mississippi, leading his army toward Vicksburg in mid-May 1863, Ulysses Grant falls from his rearing horse, suffers concussion and dies. Sherman takes over, approaches Vicksburg, and then dashes his forces futilely agains John C. Pemberton’s fortifications. Joe Johnston brings up his army and hammers the Yankees from the rear. Sherman himself is drilled in the head by a Southern bullet. “The Army of the Tennessee,” writes Kantor, “weakened and demoralized, was trapped against the Mississippi shore” by the combined armies of Pemberton and Johnston. It surrenders o June 30. A thousand miles away, at Gettysburg, the Southerners win again. After his infantry chases the I and XI Corps through town, Lee shows uncharacteristic resolve in ordering Dick Ewell to attack Cemetery and Culp’s Hills. The Confederates storm the heights and send the Yankees packing. “The battered Eleventh Corps - or rather the survivors o that much-mauled organization,” Kantor explains, “gave way

rapidly and blundered toward the rear in panic.” When Lee orders

his troops to seize the Round Top south of town before the enemy can, he is in position to dispatc Meade’s several corps as they come up. The Confederate army launches hot pursuit, “crushing the Northern forces in detail,” with vigorous help from Stuart’s cavalry. “By sunset on July 3,” the author concludes, “the Army of the Potomac had dissolved into hopeless tatters – a pitiful mockery of an army.” After Washington falls and Lincoln surrenders, U.S. officials agree a peace conference in September, which recognizes Confederate independence.5 Pete Longstreet gets his due i Mark Nesbitt’s If the South Won Gettysburg (1980). After his infantry has routed the two Union infantry corps on July 1, Gen. Lee takes Longstreet’s advice and breaks off the battle. The Confed erate army maneuvers southward,

interposing between Meade and Washington. Lee forms a strong line along Rock Creek and dares the Federals to attack him there. When they do, July 3-5, Meade’s forces are bloodily beaten back, losing 12,000 men; Sedgwick is killed, Win Hancock wounded seriously. The surviving corps leaders counsel surrender. “There was no more to be done. Ammunition was dangerously low,” Nesbitt relates; “if the Confeder ates decided to attack they would have no problem over-running the demoralized men under Meade’s command.” Reluctantly the Union commander decides to give in, and under a flag of truc asks to meet with Lee, although, Meade tells his staff, he would rather die a thousand deaths.6 Sheldon Vanauken of a different take in his article, “The World After the South Won.” The story hinges on the British, whose government, in conjunction with the French, offers in early November 1862 to mediate the American conflict. The C.S. government agrees; the U.S. government belligerently refuses. England accordingly recognizes the Confederacy. As Vanauken’s tonguecheek narrative approaches its conclusion, regiments of the British Expeditionary Force, including the Coldstre Guards, are wheeling into line to help General Lee’s army crush the Federals at Gettysburg. “The Allies” march into Washington within a few days, and shortly thereafter the United States government (temporar removed to Portland, Me.) signs a treaty of peace with the Confederacy.7

We could go on, but I’m running out of space. Edward G. Longacre imagines what might have happened if Jeb Stuart, rath er than riding off on a raid, had kept close to Lee’s army in late June. Confederate cavalry feeds intelligence to Lee as Meade’s army approaches, and drives Yankee troopers through Gettysburg on July 1. Ewell’s divisions seize the town and the heights south of it, destroying the I and XI Corps. Meade deploys the rest of his army along Pipe Creek, but Lee is in no hurry to bring o battle. For weeks, gray columns forage in central Pennsylvania as an exasperated Lincoln fires Meade and replaces him with Dan Sickles. After Stuart’s horse men sack Philadelphia, Lee finally launches his crushing blow against Sickles’ army. “The magnitude of the Union defeat – the last full-scale battle in the eas theater,” Longacre concludes, “deserves a broader canvas than

The richness of our topic is affirmed by publication of an entire book of essays, Alternative Gettysburgs (2002). One of my favorites is that by William R. Forstchen, “Lee’s Victory at Gettysburg…And Then What?” The author envisions “not a half victory such as Second Manassas where the Union army is sent reeling in retreat but neverthele escapes relatively intact.” Rather, Forstchen sees Southerners achieving “an Austerlitz or Cannae, a battle of near-total annihilation.” The prospect of Robert E. Lee emulating Hannibal (Cannae, 216 B.C.) or Napoleon (Austerlitz, 1805) is thrilling i deed. On July 2, Hood and Ewell swing around their respective flanks to envelop Meade’s army, which is caught in “a classic dou ble envelopment which triggers a panic in the Union army.” The Confederates pour in a merciless fire (Hancock, Chamberlain dead), and take 40,000 prisoners. Meade gives up his sword, and Stuart chases down the Yankees managing to escape.9 It is this same Bill Forstchen who is Newt Gingrich’s co-author in their Gettysburg (2003). As we’ve seen before, Lee takes Longstreet’s advice, marches to a defensive position south of Gettysburg and forces Meade to attack. Lee’s veterans inflict so many casualties that the Army of the Potomac is virtually destroyed. “My fault, all my fault, a grieving Meade laments just before he is shot and killed whil trying to escape. At the end of Forstchen and Gingrich’s story, President Lincoln is vowing to continue the war, wondering how he will do it. “There are so many ifs now,” he says.10

ll so many ifs, and Gettysbu ers a whole lot of them.

ndnotes: Winston Churchill, “If Lee had Not Won the Battle of Gettysburg,” in J.C. Squire ed., If: Or History Rewritt (New York, 1931; originally published in Scribner’s Mag azine, December 1930). Alexander A. Lawrence, Tongue in Cheek (Atlanta, 1979), 38. Otto Eisenschiml and E.B. Long, As Luck Would Have It: Chance and Coincidences in the Civil War (Indianapo lis, 1948), 86. Ward Moore, Bring the Jubilee (New York, 1952), 1, 13 187. MacKinlay Kantor, “If the South Had Won the Civil War,” LOOK, Nov. 22, 1960, 32. Mark Nesbitt, If the South Won Gettysburg (Gettysburg, 1980), 146. Sheldon Vanauken, “The World After the South Won,” Southern Partisan, Spring 1984, 15. Edward G., Longacre, “’Absolutely Essential to Victo ry’: Stuart’s Cavalry in th Gettysburg-Pipe Creek Campaigns,” in Peter G. Tsoura ed., Dixie Victorious: An A ternate History of the Civi War (London, 2004), 169. William R. Forstchen, “Lee’s Victory at Gettysburg…And Then What?” in Brian Thomsen and Martin H. Greenberg eds., Alternate Gettysburgs (New York, 2002), 325-26. Newt Gingrich and William R. Forstchen, Gettysburg: A Novel of the Civil War (New York, 2003), 450, 461.

By Stephen Davis We’re always glad that our “trivia” column elicits thoughtf corrections. One such is mailed to us by Ora Eads of Nashville, who refers to our first quiz of past April. In question 3 we sta “other than the Lincoln conspira tors, only one man was executed by the U.S. after the war for hi wartime activities.” Our answer was Henry Wirz, Andersonville commandant, who was hanged in Washington on Nov. 10, 1865. But Ora reminds us that Confederate guerrillas in Missouri were charged during the war and subsequently hanged. One such was the notorious Champ Ferguson, whose neck was stretched Oct. 20, 1865. Another was Lt. Charles Brownlee, charged in 1863 as a bushwhacker and spy. When he surrendered after the war, “expecting to be granted the same generous terms as other ex-Confederates,” as Mr. Eads writes us, he was apprehended and hanged on May 10, 1865. And more on our blunder, in our May column, when we implied that the war ended with Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. Diane M. Smith, Site Manager of Bennett Place State Historic Site in Durham, reminds us that Joe Johnston surrendered there on April 26, not to mention Dick Taylor’s capitulation in Alabama May 4; Kirby Smith May 26, etc. “We continually have to educate our visitors on the intricacies of the end of the Wa Diane adds, “and inform them that Appomattox was simply the

Powell Wins 22nd Austin Civil W AUSTIN, TEXAS—David A. Powell, a Chicago historian has won the twenty second annual Daniel M. and Marilyn W. Laney Book Prize given by the Austin Civil War Round Table, Inc. The winning work is The Chickamauga Campaign―Bar-

ren Victory: The Retreat into Chattanooga, the Confederate Pursuit, and the Aftermath of the Battle, September 21 to Oc

tober 20, 1863, published by Savas Beatie. Barren Victory is the third concluding volume of Powell’s Chickamauga Campaign trilogy, a comprehensive examination of one of the most important and complex military operation of the Civil War. Barren Victo examines the immediat aftermath of the battle with unprecedented detail. The narrative opens at dawn on Monday, Sept. 21,

eginning of the end and NOT he final end.” Well done, readers! Keep me onest with those emails and leters! Answers are on page 29. And now, for some Gettysburgelated questions: . The bronze monument honoring North Carolina soldiers at Gettysburg, dedicated in 1929, was sculpted by an artist known for another famous chiseled American memorial. Who was he? . A Confederate division commander ordered Brig. Gen. James Johnston Pettigrew on June 30 to march to Gettysburg and “search the town for army supplies (especially shoes).” Name him. . From Abraham Lincoln to Jimmy Carter, presidents of the United States have visited Gettysburg battlefield. One bought a farm there, at which he lived after his time in the White House. Which president? . Thirty years after the battle, this Union officer was awarded the Medal of Honor for “daring heroism and great tenacity in holding his position on the Lit tle Round Top against repeated assaults.” Who? . A lot of historians have tackle Gettysburg on one of its three days, but this author published notable books on The First Day (2001), The Second Day (1987), and even Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill (1993). Which writer are we talking about? . Walking through Soldier National Cemetery, one sees

Table’s Prize 1863, with Union commander Gen. William S. Rosecrans in Chattanooga and most of his Federal army in Rossville, Ga. Confederate commander Gen. Braxton Bragg has won the signal victory of his career, but has yet to fully grasp that fact or

the fruits of his success. With the publication of Barren Victory, the Chickamauga Campaign and the bloodiest two days of

the Civil War has the detailed history it never has had before. James Hessler, author of Sickles at Gettysburg, in a review of Powell’s book wrote, “The post-battle coverage is simply unprecedented among prior Chickamauga studies, ranging from graphic eyewitness descriptions of the battlefield’s horrors to in-depth consideration of the outcome’s strategic and political implications. Powell seamlessly weaves the stories

poem written to honor American soldiers of the Mexican War. What are the names of the poem and of its author? 7. In Michael Shaara’s The Killer Angels, Longstreet relates to Fremantle that he had been chat ting around a fire when someone remarked, “Well, maybe you are come from an ape, and maybe I am come from an ape, but General Lee, he didn’t come from no ape.” The Southerners were discussing a book, On the Origin of Species, which had been published just two years before the war. Who wrote it? 8. On the second day, the Irish brigade prepared to go into the fight when a priest stepped up a boulder and offered a prayer absolution. The soldiers knelt, hats off and heads bowed, as th chaplain reminded them that the “Catholic church refuses Christian burial to the soldier who turns his back upon the foe or deserts his flag.” What was the name of the priest? 9. “The 18 guns have been driven off. For God’s sake come quick, or we cannot support you. Ammunition nearly out.” This note was sent to General Pickett just before the Confederates launched their charge on the third day. Who wrote it? 10. Before President Lincoln was invited to deliver “a few appro priate remarks” at the dedicati of the soldiers’ cemetery at Ge tysburg, a Massachusetts politi cian known as a good speaker was asked to give the main address. Name him. Book Review Editor. He can be contacted by email at

of the campaign’s large cast of characters together, including full discussions of Braxton Bragg’s limited options... Every enthusiast of the American Civil War’s Western Theater will want this essential final volume of Dave Powell’s series in their

of the Austin Civil War Round Table, Inc. The Daniel M. & Marilyn W. Laney Prize is awarded yearly by the Austin Civil War Round Table, Inc. for distinguished scholarship and writing on the military or political history of the Civil War. For more information, contact the President of the Austin Civil War Round Table, Inc., David

Book Explores Union High Command Dysfunction During the McClellan McClellan and the Union

Leadership Gaps That Cost a Timely Victory. By Jeffrey W. Green. Bibiography, endnotes, 214 pp., 2017. McFarland & Co.,

The first two years of the Civi War were marked by the Union’s inability to devise and implement a successful military strategy. A the heart of this problem were th failures of the North’s primary army, the Army of the Potomac in the Virginia Theater. In his new book, Australian history lecturer Jeffrey Green explores this problem as one of dysfunction at the highest levels. Green evaluates the tenure of the army’s fir commander, George B. McClellan, and the legacy which resulted from repeated violations of th chain of command by politicians and generals. Green describes conflicting tra ditions which clashed when the nation confronted its most complex and biggest war up to that date: (1) a largely distrusted pr fessional military establishment leading a small standing army, and (2) reliance on volunteer militia in times of crisis, led b non-professional civilians. The consequence, in Green’s view, was that from August 1861 for-

ward, proper military protocol was disregarded as the president, cabinet officers, members of Congress, McClellan himself, and subordinate generals routinely ignored the chain of command. This problem persisted throughout McClellan’s tenure until No-

vember 1862 and continued when his successors, Ambrose Burnside and Joseph Hooker, were

CWN Book Review Editor, 4090 Audubon Drive, Marie

David Letterman Inspired Gettysburg Book undermined by pro-McClellan subordinates who freely met with Lincoln and with other civilians to lodge complaints about their commanding officers. Green’s conclusion is that this dysfunction prevented the Union from formulating and implementing an effective military strateg Instead, it persisted in what Gre views as the failed “limited war” Virginia-centric strategy that wa pursued throughout the first two years. Green has capably shown the dysfunction, which he identifies and whose causes he describes. Less compelling are his conclusions about consequences on the battlefield. There is little doub that it may have played a role in the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, especially in the tug of war betwee McClellan and Lincoln over the number of troops withheld from the former to protect Washington. But other failures by the Army of the Potomac are more convincingly tied to poor tactical and operational decisions. Chancellorsville, in particular, probabl should have resulted in a significant Union victory, and even Fredericksburg as planned by Burnside need not have ended in the bloody failure which ensued when what was originally intended as a supporting attack became the principal effort. Green also ignores the significant role of t Confederate opponent in these battles. Green’s criticism of the weight placed by the Union command on Virginia and of the original “limited war” aims (on which most agreed at the time) is questionable. While Green has employed a number of the important primary and secondary sources, he unaccountably has not accessed the late Joseph L. Harsh’s still-authoritative 1970 Ph.D. thesis, “George Brinton McClellan and the Forgotten Alternative.” Harsh insightfully de scribed McClellan’s August 1861

plan as one which sought to impose overwhelming force on the

Confederacy’s main army in Virginia, not simply on its capital Richmond, and which envisioned several coordinated supporting offensives in Tennessee, the Mississippi, and elsewhere. The

significant difference between this plan and that which Grant

undertook with ultimate success in 1864 apparently was not the objective—it was McClellan’s

intent to fight one decisive batt rather than Grant’s campaign of attrition. Green’s rejection of the “Virginia first” strategy also ignores the realities of a Federa capital which was plainly vulnerable to attack from the immediately neighborin Confederacy and of t Confederates’ own concentration of force in Virginia. Moreover, while Green has squarely blamed McClellan and Lincoln for the 1861 undermining of General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, Harsh showed that this was an important part inevitably due to Scott’s virtual abdication of his duties after First Bull Run and to the administration’s and Scott’s failure to adequately lim McClellan’s role. There are editorial concerns. Throughout, there is occasional repetition of facts already state and a random failure to identify actors who emerge onto the scene. These problems reach a crescendo in the chapter on Hooker. He did not graduate from West Point in 1827, nor did he graduate in the same class with William T. Sherman. Hooker did not have 170,000 troops in the Army of the Potomac in spring 1863, and the deceased Edwin V. Sumner could not have been one of Hooker’s complaining subordinates after Chancellorsville. Errors of this type should have been caught. While these flaws detract from Green’s work, his book does make a convincing case that all of the actors involved created a climate of tension, conflict, and “back door” communication which could not have helped the Union effort. Perhaps this was due in part to leaders learning new, previously undefined roles and to an administration which had to satisfy a number of opposed constituencies among the Border States, loyal Democrats, and the radicals in Lincoln’s own party.

For these reasons, Green’s book is worthwhile for demonstrat-

ing how command dysfunction quickly and persistently became a central feature of the Union’s war.

attorney in Boston with a lifelong interest in the Civil War. H

is descended from Isaac Foskett, who served for three years in the Engineer Battalion with the Army

of the Potomac. In addition to numerous reviews in Civil War News, he has given Civil War Roundtable presentations on the subject of Civil War field artill tactics.

Top Ten at Gettysburg. By Richard Bellamy, Jay Jorgensen, Lawrence Korczyk, Michael Rupert, William “Pat” Schuber, Ralph Siegel and James Woods. Edited by Jay Jorgensen. Map, photos, notes, index, 280 pp, 2017. History Attic Books, 1162 St. George Avenue #139, Avenel

More has been written about the battle of Gettysburg than any other event in the Civil War What makes this book unique is that it is a collaboration by se al well-known authors who have combined their talents to compil a list of the “top ten” regardin different aspects of Gettysburg. In his introduction, Editor Jay Jorgensen relates that the idea for the book came after watching an episode of David Letterman’s Late Show and his famous “Top 10” skits, as well as his wife’s participation in the Gettysburg marathon. Jorgensen, a judge from New Jersey, is the author o an acclaimed book on the Wheatfield at Gettysburg, and his con tributors are equally well known in the field. For the reader who likes

Fine Antiques & Civil War I Steven E. Hell 231 Juniata PKWY East• Newpo

detailed tactical histories of wh individual soldiers and regiments were doing on the field, this boo does not fit that bill. Rather, i is a great overview of what the authors feel are defining aspects of the battle. In that Top Ten at Gettysburg is a macro-history, rather than a micro-history. The book’s colorful potpourri includes such categories as the Top 10 Rare and Unique Cannon on Exhibit in the Park, Top 10 Command Decisions, Top 10 Enduring Controversies, and Top 10 Colonels at Gettysburg. Each contributor presents his own piece, and there is no argument or discussion among them about what others might feel could have made the list Each Top 10 is subjective and other readers might have other opinions, but together they provide a great blend of famous and not so famous quotes, monuments, and participants from the battle. The authors do a grea job in providing equal treatment to both Union and Confederate participants. The book is well illustrated and contains some good maps to illustrate where the events chronicled took place. In conclusion, this book presents a great blend of material from the battle of Gettysburg. It is well written, and expertly edi ed by Jorgensen. Both the novice and the well-read scholar of the battle will find enlightening information. A detailed bibliography, maps, and illustrations add to the work.

Robert Grandchamp is the awardwinning author of eleven books on American military history. He received his M.A. in American history from Rhode Island College A former National Park Ranger, Robert is an analyst with the government, and resides with his wife in Jericho Center, Vermont.

Gingrich’s story, President Lin-          (New York, 2002), 325-26.       intricacies of the end of the War,”         are we talking about?              Book Review Editor.
Gingrich’s story, President Lin- (New York, 2002), 325-26. intricacies of the end of the War,” are we talking about? Book Review Editor.
Chickamauga Campaign trilogy,         review of Powell’s book wrote,         by the Austin Civil War Round
Chickamauga Campaign trilogy, review of Powell’s book wrote, by the Austin Civil War Round