An Important, but Flawed Work of Reference
Armies in Gray: The Organizational History of the Confederate States Army in the Civil War. By Dan C. Fullerton. Notes, 1,338 pp., 2017. Louisiana State University Press, lsupress.org. $199.00 hardcover.
Reviewed by Stephen Davis
One doesn’t read the Encyclopedia Britannica start-to-finish, like a novel. You certainly don’t set out to copy it, like Jabez Wilson did in Sherlock Holmes’ adventure of “the Red-Headed League.”
No, one keeps reference works for, well, occasional reference. In this manner, one might consult from time to time Dan C. Fullerton’s Armies in Gray: The Organizational History of the Confederate States Army in the Civil War.
But unlike an encyclopedia, whose alphabetical presentation of expository topics is pretty straightforward, this work bears a bit of explaining.
Fullerton takes sixteen snapshots of the entire Confederate army, quarterly from June 1861 to March 1865, spanning from Virginia to the Trans-Mississippi. All military units are listed: corps, divisions and brigades (with commanders named), down
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to regiments. Figures are given for the numerical strengths of the various commands.
Let’s take, for example, the section on Confederate forces’ strength on June 30, 1864. The army was stretched over eight geographical departments, from Virginia to Texas. The section covers thirty pages; in another whopping hundred pages of endnotes, Fullerton exactingly describes the evolution of the various commands, detailing component units and offering plenty of other information.
I’m always interested in numerical strength, but unfortunately the more I delve into Fullerton’s opus, the more I am perplexed. For instance, it states that the strength of Lee’s army on June 30 was 46,691, a figure he got from the Army of Northern Virginia’s return of June 30. The compiler never gives his sources; I found that return after some searching (OR, vol. 40, pt. 2, 707- 708). Then when I compared the OR return number to Fullerton’s, I found they’re not the same.
Strength of the Army of Tennessee, June 30, 1864, is posted at 77,441, which is indeed the figure given in the army’s abstract from returns (vol. 38, pt. 3, 678). But that number is the army’s “aggregate present,” not “present for duty.” Richard McMurry is one scholar (in Atlanta 1864, 2000), who astutely asserts it is the Confederates’ “present for duty” figure we should always look at. Steven H. Newton makes the same argument for PFD in his Lost for the Cause: The Confederate Army in 1864 (2000). I don’t see that Fullerton explains why he opts for aggregate present figures, which I find peculiar for a scholar of military history. (Fullerton is associate professor in the School of Advanced Military Studies at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, but I had to go to the publisher’s website to learn this.)
This massive work (1,338 pages) has neither bibliography nor index, but neither does the Encyclopedia Britannica. So I’ll keep it around, like my other reference works, hoping that it’ll help my research one of these days.
Captain James Carlin, Anglo-American Blockade Runner. By Collin Carlin. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index, 275 pp., 2017, University of South Carolina Press, www.sc.edu/uscpress. $34.99 hardcover.
Reviewed by Richard W. Hatcher III
It is not surprising that the majority of books on the war address land battles, campaigns, units and commanders. And while the number of publications which address women, slavery, and other cultural/societal subjects has increased, those about the war on the water still receive limited coverage. The new biography, Captain James Carlin, Anglo-American Blockade Runner, is an addition to the volumes addressing the role of fresh and salt water action during the war. Carlin, like other captains of blockade runners, undertook some of the most romantic, daring and dangerous events on the waves.
The son of a member of the British Coast Guard Service, James served a four-year apprenticeship with a shipping company and became merchant marine officer in 1853. The following year found him in service to the U.S. Coast Survey as a master’s mate and pilot. For six years he worked surveying the coast from Wilmington, N.C., to Fernandina, Fla. The knowledge of the southeast coast he amassed proved invaluable during his career as a blockade runner during the war.
Carlin’s success afforded him money and prestige, and with it he purchased a house in Charleston and married into one of the city’s well-known families. But he was not immune to capture; in four years he was apprehended twice. The first seizure occurred in 1861 on a run into Charleston. His ship, damaged in heavy seas, was easy prey. Because he was a British citizen and since his ship was “officially” headed for New Brunswick, Canada, Carlin was soon released and quickly found his way to the helm of another vessel. He was captured the second time in 1862, when a passenger on the Memphis about 40 miles off Charleston. After five months as a prisoner at Ft. Lafayette, N.Y., he was finally released through British diplomatic efforts. Upon release, Carlin “returned to blockade-running with a vengeance.” By August 1863, after several successful runs, he became the supervising captain for the Importing and Exporting Company (I&E Co.) of Charleston. In November 1863, the I&E Co. sent Carlin to England to arrange for the construction of three new blockade runners. He and his family settled in Liverpool and through the end of the war Carlin supervised the new construction and I&E’s “fleet.”
Carlin did not invest all his funds in the Confederacy, and his overseas accounts afforded him the means to live comfortably in England, maintain his Charleston home and travel regularly between the two. In the years following the war he apparently worked in several occupations, some in the maritime industry. He ran a shipment of arms to Cuba in 1869 during the failed 1868-78 Ten Years War for Cuban Independence. In 1881 he abandoned his family. James Carlin died at age 88, on Wards Island in New York City at a facility for sick and destitute immigrants.
The writing style of the author, great-grandson of the blockade-runner, probably resonates more among British readers than Americans. For example, he uses unfamiliar naval references. In relating Carlin’s attempted run into Charleston, October 1861, the author writes that he “quickly ran up the Red Ensign” after being seen by the blockading squadron. It was then hauled down, and run back up with “the Union Jack in the down position.” Most American readers will not recognize the “Red Ensign” reference and a fair number might not recognize the “Union Jack” hung upside down as a sign of distress. Furthermore, he misspells names, rivers, and towns. For example, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnson is introduced as “Arthur”; Goose Creek, South Carolina is “Goose Green Creek”; and the Wando River, which flows into the Cooper River near Charleston, appears as the “Waldo River.” The H.L. Hunley appears as the “Huntley” and Carlin states that it sank four times rather than three.
Sections of the book seem to contradict each other, and the author’s chronology in the storytelling is often confusing or disjointed. On page 26, Carlin leaves the U.S. Coast Survey on April 30, 1860; he moved to Texas with his family and by October had purchased over 200 acres in Comal County. On the next page the author writes that Carlin “was soon back at sea as a captain of a packet boat” operating from “eastern Florida, Savannah, and Charleston.” Two pages later, the author states that Captain Carlin, after being captured in October 1861, had been living in Nassau since the spring of 1860 and that during this time, he had also been “the captain of the Cecile on a ‘regular run from Charleston.’”
Collin Carlin has related a fascinating tale of his blockaderunning great-grandfather. His research in England, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland and the U.S. is impressive, but sadly, he failed to make use of a “fact checker” and editor. For that reason, this new publication on an important element in the area of Civil War history provides limited information on the subject.
Richard W. Hatcher III has retired as Historian at Fort Sumter National Monument, after 44 years with the National Park Service.
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Reviewed by Robert P. Bender
The Civil War in the southwest United States has not exactly been ignored by previous generations of historians, but it is fair to say it has largely been treated as an interesting but peripheral backwater region of the war. Attention has been paid primarily to those events or issues that relate most directly to the larger and traditional military or political considerations of the
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national conflict. The 1862 battles of Valverde and Glorieta, New Mexico, as well as the 1864 massacre of Native Americans at Sand Creek, Colorado, have all received individual scholarly attention over the years. The same can be said of significant historical personalities associated with the region during the Civil War, such as Edward Canby, Henry Sibley, and the ignominious John Chivington. The unique cultural and political landscape of the Southwest, however, has never before received such a thorough and nuanced examination of the factors that defined the war in that region as well as the impact of its aftermath upon the varied populations.
Andrew E. Masich is no newcomer to an appreciation of the Civil War in the Southwest, having previously authored a biography of the former Confederate and Cheyenne dog soldier George Bent and a study of the California volunteers in Arizona. In his most recent piece of scholarship, Civil War in the Southwest Borderlands 1861-1867, Masich has created a masterpiece of multidisciplinary analysis, not only of the military and political events as they relate to the larger experience of the war, but also of the way in which the war shaped and was shaped by cultural and historical factors unique to the southwestern states and territories. As Masich deftly demonstrates, alliances and rivalries between ethnic groups of the Southwest reflect centuries of intercultural and intracultural relations that date back to the Spanish entrada.
The geographic regions that define the focus of this study include New Mexico and Arizona, parts of California and Texas, as well as the Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua. The concept of borders, however, is necessarily fluid and serves as much as a cultural term as a geographic reference. In addition to the traditional military campaigns, Masich has produced a dynamic multidisciplinary study of the Anglo, Hispanic, and Native American cultures that vied for dominance of the region before, during, and after the Civil War. The conflicts of these years occurred within and across formal national boundaries and did not recede with the onset of the national conflict. Indeed, the Civil War served as an extension of the existing struggle for political, economic, and military dominance of the region.
Masich has produced a deeply researched work with a useful glossary of terms and richly annotated endnotes, and also deserves praise for his exhaustive work with the Indian Depredation Claims housed in the National Archives. These documents serve as the foundation for Masich’s insights into the changing nature of violence in the Southwest, specifically the difference between culturally-based raids conducted as a matter of daily life, and the more destructive characteristics of warfare as practiced on a larger and more political scale. This vivid portrait of an intensely and diversely textured cultural landscape adds a significant new chapter to our understanding of the populations and conflicts of the Southwest borderlands and should be consulted by any researcher interested in the region and its people or the events that shaped the mid-19th century.
Robert Patrick Bender graduated from the University of Wisconsin- La Crosse and the University of Arkansas. He is a tenured Instructor of History at Eastern New Mexico University-Roswell. Like His publications include Grass before the Scythe: The Life and Death of Sgt. William Remmel, 121st New York Infantry (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007) and Worthy of the Cause for which They Fight: The Civil War Diary of Brigadier General Daniel Harris Reynolds, 1861-1865 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2011).
Reviewed by Lawrence K. Peterson
Although often not connected with Civil War sites, Fort Snelling, located just north of the present Minneapolis-Saint Paul Airport, was a significant factor during the Civil War, not to mention its history before and after. In active existence from 1820 to 1946, it is now preserved as an historic site. Located on the Minnesota River at its junction with the Mississippi River, the fort was a prominent fixture in Minnesota’s history from long before statehood through the end of World War II.
During the Civil War, Fort Snelling was the recruiting center for the state of Minnesota. In 1862, taking advantage of the lack of a strong military presence, local Dakota Indians went on the warpath and killed many settlers. Maj. Gen. John Pope was sent to quell this war on the settlers. For the next three years he conducted operations out of Fort Snelling, effectively eliminating any further aggression by these Indians.
Author Stephen Osman has done a masterful job of delineating the history of the fort with special emphasis on its role in the Civil War. He should know, as he was the resident historian there for some three decades. He combines the historical
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facts with many quotes from persons actually there, giving the reader an excellent sense of the atmosphere surrounding the fort. With over 100 photos, many rare, and seven maps, he illustrates the fort’s history.
The photos alone are very impressive and revealing. While many are typical scenes about the fort over the years, Osman includes many unusual photos, such as young soldiers enjoying good horseplay and soldiers eating lunch. Also he includes a picture of a court-martial and army saddlers at work: scenes uncommon in most books.
The author describes in detail the early history of the fort prior to the war, allowing the reader to learn of its initial importance. Likewise, the history of the fort is continued after the war. Fort Snelling existed much longer than most frontier U.S. Army forts.
This is a very readable book, and as informative as any other books concerning this fort. My only very minor concern is that on a couple of maps of the fort, contrary to most books about forts, Osman does not label the various buildings which he refers to in his chapters. Given all of the information about the layout of the fort over time, this is a very small inconvenience.
For those interested in the history of Minnesota, its Civil War years, and the role Fort Snelling played in the U.S.-Dakota conflict of 1862, this book is highly recommended.
Lawrence K. Peterson is the author of Confederate Combat Commander, the Remarkable Life of Brigadier General Alfred Jefferson Vaughan Jr., published by the University of Tennessee Press in 2013. A retired airline pilot, he is president of the Rocky Mountain Civil War Round Table.
Reviewed by Frank J. Williams
The proverbial glass is halffull here in Six Encounters with Lincoln, with negativity seldom seen in attempting to explore and explain Abraham Lincoln’s life and presidency. Though well written, Elizabeth Brown Pryor’s account becomes tedious with irrelevancies, lacking a thoughtful analysis and a powerful narrative. The author barrages a reader with a cascade of details seemingly in hopes of proving her “skepticism”—so much so that the reader becomes more skeptical of the author than President Lincoln. Missing is the sort of resonant narrative that Ron Chernow has turned into an art form, in which momentous historical events are deftly recreated in a subject’s life, situated in a time and a place.
In a final work before her untimely death, Pryor goes out of her way to find criticisms of Lincoln. She tries, unsuccessfully, to
GEORGIA’S CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS In Honor of a Fallen Nation Gould B. Hagler, Jr.
This unique work contains a complete photographic record of Georgia’s memorials to the Confederacy, a full transcription of the words engraved upon them, and carefully-researched information about the monuments and the organizations which built them. These works of art and their eloquent nation’s profound grief, praise the soldiers’ bravery and patriotism, and pay homage to the cause for which they fought.
construct a major condemnation from little incidents. For example, the idea that Lincoln’s informality in office and as commander-in-chief hurt the war effort because some generals did not react well to his approachable, informal and perhaps even sloppy appearance, is no better a read of history than President Trump saying Andrew Jackson would have stopped the Civil War.
In her effort to examine the political demons that Lincoln confronted in the exercise of presidential power and those that emerged from the very nature of democracy itself—as well as the diversity of the American people and their demands—the author unfortunately applies 21st century values to the mid-19th century. She fails to accept Lincoln and his actions within the context of his times, but examines him as if he were from our generation. In reality, Lincoln was a progressive and, arguably, an “enlightened male” by 1860s standards.
The book consists of six encounters between the sixteenth president and his constituents as a means to explore his attitudes towards a wide range of Americans and the presidency itself. She criticizes Lincoln heavily, from: 1) his practice of hiring friends and political allies for jobs they were ill-suited—as if he had a civil service (this would come much later during Chester Arthur’s administration) on which to make political appointments; 2) his thoughts on women (early in his life Lincoln believed that women should have the right to vote, something that did not occur until the next century); 3) his mistreatment of African-Americans, despite Lincoln’s evolving into a great emancipator, changing the war’s aim from reunion to reunion and freedom; and 4) his treatment of Native Americans, although
inscriptions express a as president he did try to reform corruption in the Department of the Interior which handled Indian affairs.
Pryor does give Lincoln an “A” for “trying” but a “D” for his mistakes and failed attempts which cost hundreds of thousands of lives. But limiting this analysis of Mr. Lincoln to merely “six encounters” is far too narrow. One begins to wonder if she is criticizing Napoleon rather than Lincoln.
While the vignettes of Lincoln’s encounters with obscure and prominent Americans are researched, when she uses them to explore critical areas of his presidency and his character, weighing his strengths and weaknesses, her hostile tone becomes unmistakable. Even in the introduction, she implies that someone else could probably have led the country through the unprecedented crisis of civil war more competently than an inexperienced prairie lawyer, whose bumbling administrative style and incompetent military leadership may have lengthened the war at the cost of thousands of lives.
This is a less than insightful view of Lincoln and his presidency. Abraham Lincoln and George Washington are always rated 1 and 2 in presidential polls of greatness, including the most recent C-SPAN poll released this year. Pryor’s attack on the president is egregiously unfair, as he would have done almost anything to prevent war with fellow citizens. For example, the author leaves out Lincoln’s first inaugural address, in which he offered a carrot and a stick to prevent conflict by promising continued support of those states which had slavery if they would not secede. Instead, he is blamed for sending food and supplies to Fort Sumter, but not arms—so much for his attempt to appease the South without aggravating the situation.
For most readers. Lincoln is a hero and America’s “captain.” It’s difficult to read this unfair account. It lacks the depth and context to our collective memory of both Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War.
For readers interested in a balanced critique of both Lincoln’s life and presidency, it would be better to turn to other books.
Frank J. Williams, of Providence, RI, is founding chairman of the Lincoln Forum. He is editor of The Mary Lincoln Enigma: Historians on America’s Most Controversial First Lady (2014) and co-editor, with Michael Burkhimer, of The Lincoln Assassination Riddle: Revisiting the Crime of the Nineteenth Century (2016).
The Slaveholding Crisis: Fear of Insurrection and the Coming of the Civil War. By Carl Lawrence Paulus. Index, bibliography, notes, 311 pp., 2017. Louisiana State University Press, lsupress.org. $49.95.
Reviewed by Wayne L. Wolf
Carl Lawrence Paulus views the Haitian Revolution of 1791 as a clarion call to the slaveholding South to prepare for a similar revolt in America. The foundation of the Constitution, argued the planter elite, made America an exceptional democracy where the antislavery North was bound to protect the interest of her Southern sister states. Americans could disagree over the morality of slavery, but to seek slavery’s abolition meant the destruction of the Union and its exceptional brand of democracy.
During the years 1791-1860, the South shifted its need to protect and expand slavery from individual state control to federal protection. Following the revolts of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, Nat Turner and John Brown, the South became increasingly paranoid over a repeat of Haiti and simultaneously more dependent on the military power of a unified nation to guard against an exploding enslaved people.
Without the westward expansion of slavery, the South would be surrounded by hostile abolitionist states, gradually imposing their will on a strangled Southern slave system, leading to universal emancipation and servile insurrection. White Southerners needed to dominate the slave system or risk a revolutionary spark that mirrored the Haitian massacre.
When the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso threatened to prevent the westward expansion of slavery, the stage was set for a Southern siege mentality. Abolitionists in the North, through petitions, the use of the mails, and support for escaped slaves continually pressured the slaveholders with the loss of income. Southerners feared the loss of their lifestyle and the potential for slaughter. They saw the proviso as breaking the bonds of Union and destroying the exceptional character of the compromise that forged the United States. With the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln, the South’s worst fears were realized. As free-soil advocates who opposed the extension of slavery, Lincoln and the Republican Party platform forced the South into a “now or never” position. Disunion finally became a better alternative than loss of a lifestyle, economy, and privilege that characterized the antebellum South. The fear of the horrors of the Haitian Revolution never left the Southern consciousness. With a Republican commander-inchief, who the South felt would not come to their aid in case of a revolt, secessionists gained the day and America would fight a Civil War to determine a new definition of American exceptionalism.
This book is a meticulously researched, easily readable, and provocative examination of the psyche of antebellum America. The constant pressure of abolitionism led to a critical stage in which the South no longer trusted the North to maintain the balance enshrined in the Constitution by the Founding Fathers.
Carl Paulus chronologically traces the South’s changing responses to pressure from the North and the fear of revolt to show how seven decades of compromise finally were too much for the proslavery faction. A division of America became inevitable.
The Slaveholding Crisis is highly recommended for its treatment of how North and South could never reconcile their differences over slavery and were destined to inevitable separation. The only question that remained was whether that division would be peaceful or overflowing with blood.
Wayne L. Wolf is Professor Emeritus at South Suburban College in Illinois and the author of numerous Civil War books, including Two Years Before the Paddlewheel: Charles F. Gunther, Mississippi River Confederate, co-edited with Bruce S. Allardice (2012). He is currently editing newly found letters of General William Whipple and the siege of Atlanta.
Gettysburg Artillery
“Double Canister at Ten Yards”: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge, July 3, 1863. By David L. Shultz. Illustrations, maps, notes, 120 pp., 2017, Savas Beatie, www.savasbeatie.com. $13.95 softcover.
Reviewed by Jay Jorgensen
“Double Canister at Ten Yards”: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge, July 3, 1863 was originally published in 1995 by Rank and File Publications. Savas Beatie has reprinted it this year and in doing so has brought back an important work on the Federal defeat of Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg on July 3. David L. Shultz, the author, is well known to students of the battle. Among his works is The Second Day at Gettysburg: The Attack and Defense of Cemetery Ridge, July 2, 1863, which he co-authored with Scott L. Mingus Sr.
Brig. Gen. Henry Hunt played an important role in repelling Pickett’s Charge. Hunt was Maj. Gen. George Meade’s chief of artillery and was instrumental in deploying the Union batteries to meet the Confederate infantry assault. His dispositions that day were exemplary. Unfortunately, many works on the third day’s actions give Hunt only passing mention and brief credit for his efforts. Shultz does not fall into that trap. Rather, he tells the story essentially through the eyes of Hunt.
Early on the morning of July 3, Hunt began his preparations. He had three main artillery groups facing westward along Cemetery Ridge that he needed to coordinate. Lt. Col. Freeman McGilvery commanded the southernmost line, which ran south to Little Round Top from the area where the Pennsylvania Monument stands today. Capt. John Hazard was in charge of the artillery extending from the Copse of Trees to Ziegler’s Grove. The third artillery line was commanded by Maj. Thomas Osborn, commander of the XI Corps artillery, and stretched along Cemetery Hill.
By focusing on Hunt’s activities, Shultz provides a detailed description of the deployment of the Union batteries. This is an important piece of the puzzle in explaining how Pickett’s Charge was able to be repulsed. By understanding not only the placement of the guns but the terrain features as well, Shultz demonstrates how the Union gunners were able to bring to bear converging fields of fire on the attacking Confederate soldiers. He also incorporates into the book six excellent maps, prepared by renowned cartographer Philip Laino.
Shultz’s narrative continues to focus on Hunt once the Confederate bombardment began shortly after 1 p.m. In doing so, he is able to keep some sense of consistency into what becomes a chaotic, desperate fight. Readers follow Hunt as he makes minor adjustments with his batteries. The decision to slack off on the return fire in order to lull the Confederate infantry forward is explained. So too is the dust-up between Hunt and Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock over the rate of fire from the Union gunners near the II Corps.
Double Canister at Ten Yards is a short volume. It lacks a bibliography, although the fifteen pages of endnotes provide readers with additional information on primary and secondary sources. Indeed, the author has updated his endnotes in order to include new material published since 1995.
The book includes a considerable amount of information on individual battery units. There are also accounts of individuals, like Osborn and Col. Charles Wainwright, commander of I Corps artillery.
Double Canister at Ten Yards provides the big-picture analysis necessary to understand how the Confederates were repulsed that day. Shultz has done an excellent job in providing readers with a cogent, consistent analysis of the importance of Hunt and his gunners in contributing to Union success at Gettysburg.
Jay Jorgensen will be one of the presenters at the Civil War Round Table Congress Conference meeting this Sept. 16 in Centreville, Va. He is the author of several books on Gettysburg, including Gettysburg’s Bloody Wheatfield, which was the recipient of the Bachelder-Coddington Award for the best new book on Gettysburg in 2002. Jay is the editor and coauthor of Top Ten at Gettysburg, which is reviewed in this issue.
Chickamauga Trilogy Capstone Stands on its Own
Reviewed by Gerald J. Prokopowicz
By the time the third volume of a trilogy appears, most potential readers have made up their minds. Those who devoured the first two books know just what to expect in the third, while those who didn’t take the plunge are unlikely to start with the last installment. In the case of David Powell’s Chickamauga trilogy, however, the usual rules don’t apply. Barren Victory, the final piece, includes a brief 80-page taste of the kind of battlefield narrative that fills the first two volumes, but the heart of the book consists of the author’s analysis of the consequences of the battle for each army, detailed orders of battle (with numbers and losses for every regiment and battery), and an exhaustive bibliography for all three volumes.
The book begins where the fighting ended, on the night of September 20-21, 1863, as the commanders of both armies attempted to penetrate the fog of war and figure out what had just happened in the great battle of the previous day. This makes an ideal starting point for readers new to the topic, as they will join Bragg, Rosecrans, and their subordinates in the process of gradually learning which parts of the battlefield they hold, where the enemy is, and whether the battle will continue for another day. Powell masters the paradoxical task of clearly portraying the confusion of September 21, aided by excellent maps. He shows how the command dysfunction of the Confederate Army of Tennessee rendered it unable to prevent the defeated Army of the Cumberland from securing itself in Chattanooga, leaving Bragg’s tactical victory barren of any strategic advantage. The narrative portion of the book concludes with a discussion of changes in the command structures of both armies that followed the battle, and an analysis of the roles of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, Union chief of staff James A. Garfield, and administration mole Charles A. Dana in the decision to relieve Rosecrans of command. Powell is sympathetic to Rosecrans and critical of Stanton, but argues that Rosecrans was mistaken in blaming Garfield for his downfall. On this topic, as in his treatment of the conflicts between Bragg and his generals, Powell’s judgments are measured and carefully supported.
Orders of battle and the bibliography fill the remaining two hundred pages. The author explains that he began his research on Chickamauga twenty years earlier in order to design a board game simulation of the battle, for which he needed to know the strength of every participating unit. While the fruits of that research will certainly delight anyone who enjoys curling up with Busey and Martin’s Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, the section is worth brows
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ing even for the non-statistically inclined. Powell gives the reader a glimpse behind the historiographical curtain by describing how he reconciled conflicting sources about the numbers who participated, or became casualties, in the battle. These numbers reveal some surprising facts; for example, Powell shows that within one month of the battle, most of Bragg’s regiments had recovered 80% or more of their losses, as stragglers came back and lightly wounded men returned to duty. The bibliography, modeled after Richard Sauers’ work on Gettysburg, includes online primary sources as well as traditional archival sources and published works, and will have to be consulted by any future writer on the Chickamauga campaign.
If you have read the first two volumes, you’ve probably already read this one as well. If you haven’t, but have any interest in how the fog of war affected Civil War battles, how the personalities of commanders could influence a battle’s outcome, or how a historian tackles a difficult research problem, you will enjoy and learn from Barren Victory.